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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this article is to discuss both empirical and 
complexity/computational limitations in dynamics, especially 
limitations that have implications for economics. In order to make 
my essay more useful for economists, I begin by emphasizing the 
grounding of mathematical laws of nature in the four basic space-
time invariance principles: translations, rotations, time 
translations, and Galilean transformations. Given the laws of 
dynamics, predictions mathematically take the form of continuous 
trajectories. I describe how physicists have started with 
continuum ideas and then have made finite precision predictions 
for chaotic dynamical systems in order to compare theory with 
the results of measurement, which are of very limited precision. I 
point out that the idea of solvability does not distinguish 
integrable from nonintegrable (chaotic or complex) dynamics, and 
locate where computational limitations begin to become 
interesting in the digitalization of a nonlinear dynamical system 
for computation. I also demonstrate the danger of existence proofs 
of equilibrium in the absence of dynamics1. In other words, I 
follow the sequence from empirical data through inferred 
dynamics and limitations on finding solutions, to the appearance 
of ideas of complexity in empirical data and dynamics.  
 
But this essay is not restricted to deterministic dynamics. Using 
stochastic dynamics, which is generally required empirically by 
markets, a new empirically based model of financial market 
dynamics is my central contribution. Here, we do not force-fit a 
preconceived model to the data, rather, we deduce the 
quantitative form of the noise from the market data. This is 
unusual, and as a consequence the volatility enters in a natural 
way, as is demanded by data. The new model leads us to the idea 
of market instability, and a prescription for falsifiability of the 
idea of the famous Invisible Hand. Finally, I ask where complexity 
enters market dynamics, and then suggest a new analogy from 
cell biology for inventions and market growth. Along the way, I 
offer an observation about ‚emergence‘. 
 
My choice of the sequence of themes described above is 
encouraged by my overlap of interest with key topics that have 
also been discussed by Kumaraswamy Velupillai: the 
unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in physics and the 
unreasonable ineffectiveness of mathematics in economics 
(Velupillai, 2003, 2005), the question of the right way to digitize a 
dynamical system for computation (Velupillai, 2003, 2004), 
                                                
1 Without stating extra conditions, both stable and unstable equilibria may be either 
falsifiability (Velupillai, 2003), and the appearance of 
computational complexity in nonlinear dynamics (Velupillai, 
2000). These are all central questions for economic theory.  
 
 
2. Symmetry Principles are the Basis of Mathematical Law 
 
Data collection and analysis are central to physics. Data collection 
in the attempt to describe the motion of bodies began with the 
ancient astronomers, who used epicycles to describe planetary 
orbits. Epicycles are not necessarily wrong, because they don‘t 
define a specific dynamical model: in modern terms, epicycles are 
truncations of Fourier series expansions of orbits (Hoyle, 1973).  
 
Physics, the mathematical description of empirically discovered 
laws of nature, began with Archimedes‘ discovery of the 
conditions for static equilibrium. Galileo and Kepler revived the 
Archimedian tradition in the seventeenth century and provided 
the empirical discoveries from which Newton was able to 
formulate nature’s dynamics mathematically in a very general 
way (Barbour, 1989). Newtonian predictions have been verified 
with high decimal precision at macroscopic length and time scales 
where, on the one hand, light speed doesn’t matter, and on the 
other where quantum phase coherence has been destroyed.  
 
Why can we discover strict mathematical laws of inanimate 
nature, and why haven’t we discovered corresponding time-
                                                                                                                                       
computable or noncomputable. 
invariant mathematical laws of socio-economic behavior? Wigner 
(1967) posed and answered both these questions in his beautiful 
essays on symmetry and invariance, where he identifies the basis 
of the seemingly unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in 
physics.  
 
Following Galileo and Kepler, scientists have discovered 
mathematical laws obeyed by nature via repeatable, identical 
experiments (physics, chemistry, genetics) and observations 
(astronomy). The foundation for the invariance of experimental 
results performed at different locations and times and in different 
states of motion lies in the symmetry principles that form the 
basis of Newtonian mechanics: mathematical laws of nature are 
invariant under translations, rotations, time translations, and 
transformations among Galilean/inertial frames.  
 
Newton’s Second Law describes a classical mechanical system  
 
 
(1) 
where p=(p1,…,pf) = mdX/dt is the momentum vector, m is a 
body’s mass, X is its position, and F is the force. If the force F 
transforms like a Cartesian vector, F‘=RF, then Newton’s law is 
covariant under Galilean transformations, spatial translations and 
rotations, and time translations. When F=0 then we have Galilean 
  
dp
dt
= F
invariance of solutions p(t), which is the mathematical basis for 
repeatable, identical experiments. In this case X is a coordinate in 
n dimensional configuration space, and the earth is approximately 
an inertial frame for experiments performed on a time scale much 
less than a day (McCauley, 1997a). 
 
Globally integrable dynamical systems, like Keplerian orbits, 
reflect the basic space-time invariance principles through the 
standard conservation laws taught in every introductory physics 
text: conservation of momentum, angular momentum, and 
energy. Without the four underlying symmetry principles, 
empirical observations would generally depend on absolute time, 
absolute position and orientation, and absolute velocity. In a 
hypothetical universe without local invariance principles, even if 
there were underlying mathematical laws of motion we would be 
unable to extract them from observational data. E.g., Galileo first 
inferred special cases of Newton’s First and Second Laws and the 
local law of gravity from very simple trajectories. A local law is a 
solution that holds for short enough space-time intervals, like the 
integrated form of Newton’s First Law (p=constant, where p is 
momentum). A global solution, like a Keplerian orbit, holds over 
an unbounded space-time region. Differential equations 
describing both continuous symmetries (generators of Lie groups) 
and dynamics (eqn. (1), e.g.) are examples of local laws of motion. 
The universal applicability of the local law (1) lies in its grounding 
in the four space-time invariance principles. Global solutions of 
local laws of motion, if they appear at all in observed data, are 
solutions that hold approximately for very long times. Strictly 
seen, in mathematics, global solutions would hold for all possible 
times, past and future. But what about holism, which is advocated 
in some quarters today? 
 
No mathematical law of motion can be deduced from empirical 
data unless a large part of the world can be neglected, to zeroth 
order, so that the most dominant features of nature can be studied 
in isolation and the rest can be described via interaction forces, 
perhaps only perturbatively. This is ‚reductionism‘, the division of 
the world into ‚dynamical system plus initial conditions‘ and 
‚environment, where the initial conditions are effectively ‚lawless‘ 
(Wigner, 1967). The idea of holism is an illusion: if every part of 
the world were strongly coupled to every other part of the world, 
then we could discover little or nothing systematic about the 
world.  
 
Aside from the known laws of physics, there are also models of 
motion that are not necessarily obeyed by any observed 
phenomena e.g., the neo-classical economic model or a complex 
adaptable model of Darwinism. Whatever the origin, empirical or 
postulated, every mathematical model that can be written down is 
a form of reductionism (the renormalization group method in 
statistical physics, valid at order-disorder transitions, reduces 
phenomena at a critical point approximately to symmetry and 
dimension). Quantum theory, the law of nature at very small 
length scales explains chemistry via atoms and molecules. Cell 
biology attempts to reduce observed phenomena to very large, 
complicated molecules, to genes and DNA, proteins, and cells. 
Proponents of self-organized criticality try to reduce the 
important features of nature to the equivalent of sand grains and 
sand piles via the hope for an underlying universality principle. 
Network enthusiasts likewise hope to reduce many interesting 
phenomena to nodes and links (Barabasi, 2002). The weakness in 
the latter two programs is that there are no known universality 
principles for driven-dissipative systems far from thermal 
equilibrium, except at the transition to chaos.  
 
The isolation of cause and effect, the standard method used by an 
auto mechanic or radio repairman to repair a defective system, is 
basically the method of science. There is no escape from 
reductionism of one form or another. Given a successful model, 
meaning one that correctly describes a particular set of data and 
predicts new phenomena, one can then try perturbatively to take 
into account previously neglected interactions, but one cannot 
imagine taking into account everything. Falsifiabilty via empirical 
data is a scientific necessity. The idea of falsifiability is not a new 
idea. Karl Popper simply put into words what hard science since 
Galileo has practiced. In physics, a new model will not be 
accepted if it only describes phenomena that are already 
understood: a new model must also make empirically falsifiable 
new predictions. For example, Newtonian mechanics was used to 
predict the existence of a ‚new‘ planet before Neptune was 
discovered. 
  
I will return to Wigner’s theme in parts 5 and 6 below. First, some 
results from nonlinear dynamics and a way to compare dynamics 
predictions with real data, e.g. with time series obtained from 
experiment or observation, in order to focus more toward our 
eventual discussion of computability limitations.  
 
 
3. Solvable Deterministic Dynamics 
 
Since p=mdX/dt where X=(X1, …, Xf) is position and m is mass, 
we can rewrite Newton’s laws as a flow in a 2f dimensional phase 
space, 
 
 (2) 
 
where phase space is a flat inner product space so that the n=2f 
axes labeled by (x
1
,...,x
n
) can be regarded as Cartesian and V(x) is 
an n-component time-independent velocity field in phase space. 
E.g., for a one degree of freedom Newtonian system dp/dt=F we 
have a two dimensional phase space where x1=X, x2=p, with 
dx1/dt=p=V1 and dx2/dt=F=V2.  
 
Flows that preserve the Cartesian volume element dΩ = dx
1
...dx
n
 
are defined by ∇⋅ V = 0 (conservative flows) while driven 
dissipative-flows correspond to ∇⋅ V ≠ 0, where ∇ denotes the 
Cartesian gradient in n dimensions. The expectation of stable 
  
dx
dt
= V(x)
equilibria in a neo-classical or any other supply-demand model 
would require a driven-dissipative system, e.g.
  
 
The condition for a phase flow is that for any initial condition xo 
the solution xi(t) = U(t)xio has no finite time singularities, 
singularities of flows at finite times are not permitted on the real 
axis in the complex time plane. The time evolution operator U(t) 
then exists and defines a one parameter transformation group for 
all real finite times t, with the inverse operator given by U-1(t) = 
U(-t), so that one can in principle integrate backward in time, xoi = 
U(-t)xi(t) as well as forward, for both conservative and for driven-
dissipative flows. That the time evolution operator U(t) has an 
inverse means that there is no diffusion; the variable x behaves 
deterministically, not stochastically. In part 7 we will relax this 
restriction to include stochastic dynamics. 
 
In deterministic dynamics, one should distinguish between the 
ideas of solvable and integrable vs. nonintegrable. The later 
category includes chaotic and complex motions, and is where 
interesting computability limitations enter in a natural way. Any 
flow, even a chaotic or complex one, has a unique, well-defined 
solution (is solvable) so long as the velocity field V(x) satisfies a 
Lipshitz condition with respect to the n variables xi. If, in 
addition, the velocity field V(x) is analytic in those variables then 
the power series locally defining the time evolution operator 
U(t)=etL, 
 
 xi(t ) = xio + t (Lxi )o + t2 (L 2xi )o /2 + . . .. .    (3) 
 
The infinitesimal generator is L = V ⋅ ∇, and (3) has a nonvanishing 
radius of convergence, so that the solution of (2) can in principle 
be defined by power series combined with analytic continuation 
for all finite times (Poincaré, 1993). The radius of convergence of 
(3) is typically small and unknown. Unless one can determine the 
singularities of (2) in the complex time plane, one does not know 
when and where to continue analytically. Therefore, in practice, 
we cannot expect to solve nonintegrable dynamical systems more 
than locally, for only very short time intervals. This is a restriction 
on predictability that precedes any computability limitations that 
follow from our next considerations. 
 
An error-free way to digitize (2) for computation (McCauley 1987, 
1993)  is to use algorithms for computable numbers for all initial 
conditions and control parameters in the local solution (3). If the 
dynamical system is chaotic or complex, then one cannot compute 
very far into the future by using fixed precision. The precision of 
the computation must be increased systematically after a typically 
small number of time steps according to the demands made by 
the largest Liapunov exponent of (3). This is easy to understand: 
the same is required in order to compute solutions y(t) of dy/dt=y 
for large times, where the solution exhibits unbounded motion 
with a positive Liapunov exponent. This equation provides us 
with the simplest example of exponential instability of nearby 
orbits, the butterfly effect. If one computes the solution y(t) mod 1 
at equally spaced discrete times, then the motion is bounded (lies 
on a circle) and one obtains a Bernoulli shift, the simplest chaotic 
dynamical system. So avoiding making a mistake while 
calculating •2 is an example of beating the butterfly effect. 
 
If one only uses a limited precision method, like floating point 
arithmetic, then the only known test for numerical accuracy of the 
solution is to integrate (2) forward in time, and then integrate 
backward again in order to try to recover the initial condition to 
within at least one decimal place. If you cannot recover a single 
digit of the assumed initial condition, then you have integrated 
illegally too far forward in time. Below, we will discuss a method 
of predicting chaotic trajectories with controlled precision that 
does not require integration forward in time. The emphasis there 
is on the use of finite precision, with systematically increasing 
precision, which reflects computability. 
 
A chaotic or complex system is always locally integrable but 
cannot be globally integrable. Integrable and nonintegrable 
systems are defined and discussed in  a simple but incomplete 
way in McCauley (1997a). Arbitrary velocity fields V(x) generally 
define nonintegrable systems, and deterministic chaos typically 
occurs. Galileo’s parabolic orbits are examples of local 
integrability of a Newtonian system. Kepler‘s planetary orbits are 
examples of global integrability for a two-body problem. But a  
Kepler orbit assumes that the solar system consists only of the sun 
and a single planet. Over extremely long times, there is evidence 
that the Newtonian dynamics of interacting planets in the solar 
system is nonintegrable and chaotic (Sussman and Wisdom, 1992). 
The Newtonian three-body problem is chaotic for arbitrary initial 
conditions.  
 
 4. Computing Chaotic Dynamics with Controlled Precision 
 
Measurement always means finite precision, and generally with at 
best few decimal place accuracy. E.g., market prices are specified 
only to within a few decimal places ($101.32. e.g.). In physics we 
are more concerned with making limited precision predictions 
correctly than with the more stringent requirement of 
computability. However, the phase space of chaotic systems is 
characterized by dense sets of unstable periodic and unstable 
quasiperiodic orbits, which are nontrivial to compute to within 
any controlled degree of decimal accuracy over long times.  
 
Rather than study local power series solutions of differential 
equations digitized for computation, it is theoretically more 
convenient to study a corresponding discrete map, like a 
stroboscopic map or a Poincaré map. Such maps are always 
invertible because flows defined by ordinary differential 
equations are perfectly time reversible. Examples of iterated maps 
derived from differential equations and physical systems are 
given in McCauley (1987, 1997a). 
 
The main ideas about maps can be most easily described by using 
a one-dimensional chaotic map of the unit interval, xn=f(xn-1), 
which necessarily has a multi-valued inverse and therefore cannot 
occur rigorously as a Poincaré map of a phase flow. To begin, 
discretize the map for computation in some integer base µ of 
arithmetic (expand the initial condition and all control parameters 
in base µ). In this case, if we choose µ •eλ where λ is the map’s 
positive Liapunov exponent for the class of initial conditions 
considered, then the meaning of λ is that we have to increase the 
precision of a forward time iteration at the rate of about one digit 
per iteration of the map in order to compute without making any 
error. Here, as in the digitization of a system of differential 
equations for computation, we meet the idea of the initial 
condition as program encoded in base µ, and the digitized 
dynamical system (the map) as computer. Most chaotic dynamical 
systems perform only trivial computations like ‚read and shift‘, 
add, multiplicaty, and combinations thereof. If one iterates such a 
system forward in discrete time n without increasing the precision 
at each time step, then one soon makes an error that ruins the 
computation. This is the most fundamental limitation on 
predicting the future for a chaotic map on a computer. In nature, 
we know the initial data to only within a few digits, and this leads 
to a similar limitation in collecting observational data. A positive 
Liapunov exponents is the condition for ‘mixing’, which is the 
condition for the applicability of the methods of statistical 
physics. Mixing also occurs in fluid turbulence, doe to an unstable 
cascade of eddies. 
 
A positive Liapunov exponent reflects local orbital instability. 
Deterministic chaos means local orbital instability combined with 
global (Poincaré) recurrence of initial conditions. We can calculate 
both the unstable periodic and quasiperiodic orbits that 
characterize chaotic systems by iterating the map backward in 
time, where the Liapunov exponent contracts rather than expands 
intervals (errors). By iterating the unit interval, the phase space of 
a one dimensional map, backward in time n, the multi-valuedness 
of the map’s inverse generates a tree that provides us with both 
the symbolic dynamics and the generating partition of the map 
(Cvitanovic et al, 1988; Cvitanovic et al’, 2003; Feigenbaum, 1988; 
McCauley, 1993, 1997a). The generating partition, a hierarchy of 
sets of intervals or length scales, is peculiar to the map, but the 
symbol sequences are universal for an entire class of topologically 
related maps: the symbol sequences are invariant under 
continuous transformations of the map. The unstable periodic 
orbits are organized on the tree. Here, we generally do not need 
the more refined idea of computability because the tree provides 
us with a hierarchy of finite precision descriptions of the fractal 
attractor or repeller, and one can compare these finite precision 
descriptions with empirical observations, if observational data are 
accurate enough. The latter condition is nontrivial to satisfy. 
 
Kepler’s neutrally stable orbits of period one were used by 
Newton to discover the inverse square law of gravity. Prior to 
that, the neutrally stable parabolic trajectories discovered by 
Galileo reflected local versions of Newton’s First and Second 
Laws of Motion (Heisenberg (1930), discovered systematically 
that he needed noncommuting operators in order to describe 
atomic spectral data). In the eighties, unstable periodic orbits 
extracted from time series near the transition to fluid turbulence 
were used to try to discover an underlying map that generates the 
transition to soft turbulence. That effort makes sense because 
there are well-defined universality classes of dynamical systems 
at the transition to chaos via period doubling, a bifurcation 
sequence described asymptotically by the renormalization group 
method. The effort to discover the universality class of maps from 
empirical data met serious nonuniqueness problems because of 
the very limited precision of the data (Chhabra et al, 1988): to 
determine the generating partition unambiguously, one needs 
very high precision in the data. This is a main point that I will 
return to in parts 7 and 9 below. 
 
To what extent can the empirically observed time series of a 
particular market be used to infer the underlying dynamics? This 
question is of central importance for economics, where market 
dynamics have not yet been deduced empirically beyond finance 
theory. This latter asertion may well raise the ire of many 
economists, and so I will explain it in part 7 below. 
 
5. Local versus Global Expectations in Dynamics 
Symmetry not only plays the key role in forming the basis for the 
discovery of laws of motion from empirical data, it also plays a 
central role when one searches for solutions of dynamical 
equations. A globally integrable dynamical system in n 
dimensions has simple solutions that are globally valid, because 
the system has n global conservation laws that restrict the motion 
to rectilinear motion via a coordinate transformation based on 
those conservation laws. Global conservation laws reflect global 
symmetries in the n dimensional phase space. 
 
If we discuss deterministic market models 
 
 
(4) 
 
then p = (p1,…pn) is the price, and the vector field ε(p) =          
D(p)-S(p) is the excess demand. This does not approximate a 
mathematical rule for a market unless supply S and demand D are 
deduced empirically from that market. Typically, as in neo-
classical theory, the functions S(p) and D(p) are merely modeled 
without paying attention to what real markets are doing. For two 
outstanding exceptions, see Osborne (1977) and Maslov (2000).  
 
Before going further, let me emphasize that there is only one 
definition of equilibrium that is dynamically correct: dp/dt=0, or 
excess demand vanishes. Contrary to confusion rampant in the 
economics and finance literature (see, e.g., McAdam and Hallett, 
2000), a limit cycle is not an equilibrium, nor is a strange attractor. 
Neither a Wiener nor lognormal stochastic process is defines 
equilibrium. More than seven diferent misuses of the term 
“equilibrium” are identified in McCauley (2004). Dynamic 
equilibria are defined by the vanishing of excess demand vanishes 
  
dp
dt
= ε(p)
at one mor more points p*, ε(p*)=0. In statistical equilibrium all 
averages of moments of the price p vanish, d<pn>/dt=0 for all 
values of n, which is the same as saying that the price distribution 
is time independent (stationary), or that the Gibbs entropy of the 
distribution is constant. We can achieve clarity of thought in 
finance and economics taking care to be precise in our 
mathematical definitions. Or, as an early Pope is reputed to have 
said, “One should tell the truth even if it causes a scandal” 
(Casanova, 1997). 
 
In deterministic market modeling, we should expect no global 
conservation law other than the ‚Walras law‘ that defines the 
budget constraint and confines the motion to a sphere in phase 
space. The budget constraint reflects the symmetry of the price 
sphere in phase space (price space), but motion on the  n-1 
dimensional price sphere is typically nonintegrable. Arrow (1958) 
discovered interesting but humanly unattainable conditions for 
the mathematical ‘existence’ of an equilibrium point (perfect 
foresight combined with total conformity: all agents have the 
same expectations into the infinite future), but equilibrium points 
on the price sphere are unstable for the typical case of 
nonintegrability.  
 
We know from nonlinear dynamics and general relativity that 
global integrability of local laws of motion (differential equations, 
iterated maps) is the rare exception. For global integrability of a 
dynamical system (2) in an n dimensional phase space, there must 
be enough symmetry that there are n-1 time independent global 
conservation laws that restrict the motion of the n-dimensional 
phase flow to trajectories that are topologically equivalent to 
rectilinear line motion at constant speed. Typically, in dynamics, 
one must almost always settle for local integrability. This means, 
as I have emphasized above, that, even if we would know a correct 
deterministic dynamics describing a market, then we could not hope 
in practice to calculate solutions that would be correct over large 
time intervals.  
 
In mainstream economics, the neo-classical equilibrium model is 
taught as if it would be useful for understanding markets 
(Mankiw, 2000; Varian, 1992), but market equilibrium is not an 
empirically established fact, and the stability of the theoretically 
predicted equilibrium is anyway unknown (Kirman, 1988). For 
the model to be useful, it would be necessary that real markets 
could be described perturbatively by starting with the neo-
classical model as a zeroth order approximation. Nothing of the 
sort has been achieved, or likely will ever be achieved. Still, the 
model has been used by the IMF, the World Bank, the E.U. and 
the U.S. Treasury as the theoretical basis for imposing extreme 
free market financial requirements on nations in the drive toward 
globalization via deregulation and privatization (Stiglitz, 2002). 
Here, an equilibrium point that cannot even be shown to be 
mathematically stable is deduced from a falsified model 
(McCauley, 2004) and is assumed to apply worldwide over 
significant time scales.  
 In reality, globalization via deregulation and privatization is a 
completely uncontrolled experiment whose outcome cannot be 
known in advance. The empirical evidence from The Third World 
is against the idea that globally uniform local rules and 
requirements yield either locally stable results or approximately 
uniform economic growth (see Stiglitz, 2002, for many qualitative 
examples of market instability). Certainly, there is no empirical 
evidence, or theoretical evidence from nonlinear or stochastic 
dynamics, to support such an idea. Furthermore, the example of 
biology tells us that, for survival, it is redundance and error 
correction ability, not efficiency, that matters.  
 
Three results about the neo-classical model beyond Arrow‘s seem 
to me to be remarkable. Sonnenschein (1973) showed that there is 
no theoretical basis via aggregation or averaging for a neo-
classical macroeconomic supply-demand model: either any curve 
or no curve at all may follow from aggregation. Contrast this with 
classical equilibrium statistical physics, which predicts 
thermodynamics uniquely via averaging. Radner (1968) has made 
the very interesting speculation that liquidity, the demand for 
money and financial markets, arises from computational 
limitations and other forms of uncertainty, although Radner 
apparently did not have in mind either a Turing machine or a 
clear idea of what he meant by his phrase ‚computational 
capacity‘ while writing his paper. Apparently unaware of 
Radner’s speculation, Bak et al (1999) tried but failed to show how 
money might emerge from the addition of noise to optimizing 
behavior. Osborne (1977) showed that the neo-classical supply-
demand model is falsified both microeconomically and 
macroeconomically. I regard Osborne, also the father of the 
lognormal price model in financial markets (Cootner, 1964), as the 
first econophysicist. 
 
The neo-classical equilibrium model is a zero entropy (or perfect 
knowledge) model. Real markets reflect inherently finite entropy 
effects like production, consumption, and decision-making. Even 
without the observations made by Osborne, the neo-classical 
model is falsified unless one can find empirical evidence from at 
least one real market for stability and equilibrium. So instead of 
arguing that ‘the neo-classical model is ideal‘ and the data are 
‘hard to describe’ (no physicist will give any weight to such an 
argument), we must ask what the unmassaged market data can 
teach us. Or, more poetically, let us ask not what we can do for 
the data (give it a massage, or attack it with a specific model in 
mind, e.g.), let us ask instead what the data can teach us. It must 
be emphasized that the approach of the physicist is not at all the 
method of the econometrician (Granger, 1999): instead of having 
limited, preconceived models in mind, we deduce the stochastic 
model from the data (see McAdam and Hallet (2000) for a good 
example an attempt to force preconceived notions on the data). I 
illustrate this program in part 7, where I will argue that real 
market data are not at all hard to fit accurately by using 
dynamical models. To the contrary, market data are too easy to fit: 
lack of uniqueness in empirically based modeling is the real 
problem that we face. Even if we would restrict our 
considerations to agent based trading models, we will not be able 
to escape the nonuniqueness. 
 
  
6. Can Economic Dynamics Emerge from Market Data? 
 
Given enough symmetry principles obeyed by prices, we should 
in principle be able to discover mathematical laws obeyed by 
markets. We will discuss two recently discovered invariance 
principles for markets below. But there is a fundamental 
difference between economic motions, like price changes (or GNP 
growth), and laws of nature. 
 
Unlike natural law, acting on human expectations creates all of 
economic behavior. Without actions determined by our brains, 
wishes, and actions, markets and prices would not exist. Nature, 
e.g., stars, planets, DNA, and atoms are not invented and 
manipulated in that way. Mathematical laws of nature are beyond 
human invention, intervention, and convention. Without human 
agreement and/or regulation, in contrast, markets and prices do 
not even exist. Given that human decisions and actions create 
markets and money, to what extent can we hope to discover an 
approximately correct dynamics of markets? And bear in mind 
that nonuniqueness due to limited precision in data analysis can 
lead us not to a single model, but to some (non universality) class 
of models. 
  Consider a distribution of markets for a single asset, like gold or 
globalized autos (Ford, Toyota, GM, VW, or BMW, e.g.) on the 
face of the earth. The price g(p,t) or returns density 
f(x,X,t)=g(p,X,t)dp/dx depends not just on price p (or returns x) 
but on location X as well. By return, I mean the logarithmic return 
x=lnp(t)/po where po is some initial or reference price and g is a 
conditional probability density, a ‘Green function’ in the language 
of physics. Therefore, the ‚no-arbitrage‘ principle is equivalent to 
the assumption of rotational invariance (McCauley, 2004) of the 
price density (or translational invariance in a tangent plane 
containing two separate nearby markets, like Berlin and 
Frabkfort). The absence of arbitrage is a purely geometric 
statement that guarantees nothing other than that the probability 
distribution of the asset is independent of position X. In 
particular, ‚no-arbitrage‘ has nothing to do whatsoever with 
market equilibrium. Market equilibrium is equivalent to time 
translational invariance of the price distribution: in equilibrium, 
g(p,t) is independent of t.  
 
There is also a weak form of ‚Galilean invariance‘ in markets. 
Consider a returns density f(x,t) for a single market in a single 
asset, like a stock (or, if you prefer, like housing in a particular 
region). By starting with the empirical histograms for that market, 
we can deduce a model of the returns distribution for vanishing 
expected return R = <x> =0 (Gunaratne and McCauley, 2002). If 
‚Galilean invariance‘ holds, then the density for a finite return R is 
given by replacing x by x-R∆t in the density f(x,t). In finance 
theory, because of nontrivial volatility D(x,t) in the stochastic 
differential equation describing the market, Galilean invariance is 
‚broken‘ by the assumption of a riskfree hedge whenever the local 
volatility is x-dependent, as is the case with the empirical finance 
distribution (McCauley, 2004). No other invariance principles are 
known for markets. From this standpoint, we should not think of 
dx/dt=0 (or dp/dt=0) only as market equilibrium, but rather 
more generally as a weak analog of Galilean invariance. The 
analog is weak because „x“ is logarithmic return instead of the 
position X of a particle in space-time. 
 
For relatively slow markets like cars and housing, where trades 
occur on a time scale of days or longer instead of seconds, one can 
always use discrete time dynamics instead of the continuous time 
version, which is at best a mathematical convenience. Stochastic 
rather than deterministic dynamics are indicated, because there is 
no evidence for local integrability in market statistics at the 
shortest times (on the order of a second for heavily traded 
financial markets, e.g.). 
 
Given this incompleteness, the absence of enough symmetry 
principles to pin down dynamical laws in economics, what can 
we do? The answer is the same as if there would be enough 
invariance principles to pin down real mathematical laws: we can 
study the available data for a specific market and try to extract a 
dynamical model that reproduces that data. In this case, we know 
in advance that we are modeling data for a particular market in a 
particular era, and that any model is expected to fail at some 
unknown time in the future. It should eventually fail as a result of 
a ‚surprise‘. Surprises are the essence of complexity and are 
discussed in part 9 below. Therefore, it’s essential that the model 
has few enough empirically known parameters to be falsifiable, 
otherwise one cannot know when the market has shifted in a 
complex/fundamental way. Such is the failure of the complicated, 
unenlightening, many-parameter models used by global banks 
(Bass, 1991).  
 
I have indicated above how such a discovery program has been 
carried out empirically where deterministic chaotic dynamics 
apply. In part 9, I will discuss the  challenge that we would face in 
trying to analyze time series reflecting deterministic complex 
dynamics, even if the underlying dynamical model would be 
simple. In part 7, we describe how to model financial markets 
empirically correctly using stochastic dynamics, and also will 
describe the difficulty in trying to extend the same program to 
nonfinancial markets.  
 
Financial markets differ from other markets mainly in that many 
trades are made very frequently, even on a time scale of seconds, 
so that very good data are available for the falsifiability of few-
parameter models. For houses or cars, e.g., the time scale for a 
large number of trades is much greater so that the data are much 
more sparse. Such markets are far less liquid and vary much more 
from one locale to another. This is main difference between 
financial and most nonfinancial markets. Because of the 
abundance of adequate and reliable data, financial markets 
provide the best testing ground for both new and old ideas. 
Financial markets exhibit the interesting characteristics of 
economic systems in general: growth and ‚the business cycle‘(see 
Goodwin (1993) for a discussion of these characteristics). When 
we speak of the ‚business cycle‘, a field where both stochastic 
(Cootner, 1964) and nonequilibrium nonlinear deterministic 
models were considered rather early (Velupillai, 1998), we no 
longer expect to discover any periodicity. We now understand it 
instead as volatility, or ‚fat tails‘, combined with lack of 
stationarity in the market distribution (the market distribution is 
simply the set of histogbrams obtained from real market data). 
Stationarity is another name for time invariance. Nonstationarity 
means that market entropy increases without limit. The nontrivial 
local volatility required to generate fat tails in the absence of 
stationarity is introduced in part 7. Market entropy is defined in 
part 8, where market instability is illustrated and discussed.  
 
My answer to the title of this section is that nonfinancial market 
histrograms obtained from time series should be studied and 
modeled empirically in the spirit of financial markets, as is 
described in the next section. 
 
 
7. Empirically Based Models of Financial Markets 
 
In a stochastic description of markets the excess demand ε(p,t) is 
modeled by drift plus noise  
 
 (5) 
 
  
dp
dt
= ε(p) = rp + p d(p, t) dB
dt
where dB is a Wiener process, so that dB/dt is white noise, and 
d(p,t)p2 is the price diffusion coefficient. But we can more 
systematically write (5) as a stochastic differential equation 
 
 (6) 
 
and use Ito calculus. The stochastic differential equation for the 
returns variable x=lnp(t)/po is given by Ito calculus as 
 
(7) 
where the returns diffusion coefficient is D(x,t)=d(p,t). We can 
understand the returns diffusion coefficient D(x,t)=d(p,t) as the 
local  volatility (McCauley, 2004), where the global (or globally 
averaged) volatility is σ2 =<(x-<x>) = ∆t, the mean square 
fluctuation in the return x. 
 
The first quantitative description of stock market returns was 
proposed by the physicist turned finance theorist M.F.M. Osborne 
(Cootner, 1964), who plotted price histograms based on Wall St. 
Journal data in order to try to deduce the empirical distribution of 
stock prices. He inferred that asset returns do a random walk, so 
that prices are distributed lognormally. The lognormal price 
distribution is generated by the stochastic differential equation 
 
  dp = rpdt + p d(p,t)dB
  dx = (r − D(x, t) / 2)dt + D(x, t)dB
 (8) 
with variable price diffusion coefficient d(p)p2=(σpp)2. The 
corresponding returns distribution is Gaussian and is generated 
by 
  
 (9) 
where the returns diffusion is constant. One can invent various 
agent-based trading models that generate Gaussian or other sorts 
of returns. This is only part of the nonuniqueness that is faced in 
modeling empirical data. 
 
Osborne‘s stochastic model is Markovian, so that the Hurst 
exponent H in σ2 =<(x-<x>) = ∆t2H is H=1/2. We know from data 
analysis that H=O(1/2) (Mantegna and Stanley, 2000), but 
whether H=.4, .5, or .6 is impossible to distinguish empirically. 
The choice H=1/2 yields models obeying the ‚efficient market 
hypothesis‘, which means simply that the market is very hard to 
beat: for H=1/2 there are no long time correlations in the market. 
A Hurst exponent H•1/2 implies fractional Brownian motion and 
yields long-time correlations that could, in principle, be exploited 
for profit. The stochastic integral that generates fractional 
Brownian motion is defined and discussed in McCauley (2004). 
 
The Black-Scholes (1973) model of option pricing assumes 
Osborne’s Gaussian returns model, but without having referenced 
Osborne. The Black-Scholes model is based on only two 
  dp = rpdt + σ ppdB
  dx = (r − σp
2 / 2)dt + σ p2dB
empirically measureable parameters, σ and r, and so is falsifiable. 
In fact, the model has been falsified: the empirical density of 
returns has fat tails f(x,t)•x-µ (fig. 1) for large returns x (Dacorogna 
et al, 2001), where µ is  a nonuniversal scaling exponent that 
varies from market to market.  
 
We do not know if the Gaussian returns model was ever accurate 
historically, because the data before the era of computerization are 
too sparse for a reliable test. Traders ca. 1990 claimed that the 
model no longer priced options correctly after 1987 (traders had 
once used Texas Instrument hand calculators with B-S 
programmed in, to price options on the trading floor). Whether 
there was a fundamental market shift to fat tails after 1987 (a 
surprise characteristic of complexity), or whether trading 
behavior changed, we simply do not know. 
 
To a first approximation, financial data since at least 1990, for 
small to moderate returns, are also not approximately Gaussian 
but are instead exponentially distributed (fig. 2). The exponential 
distribution is generated by a Markovian model with nontrivial 
local volatility (diffusion coefficient D(x,t)) 
 
(10) 
 
 
where b and b' are constants, ν, γ are proportional to 1/•∆t, and δ 
depends on ∆t and defines the peak of the returns density. When 
  
D(x, t) = b
2 (1 + ν(x − δ),x > δ
′ b 2 (1 − γ (x − δ), x < δ
   
   
   
   
   
‘Galilean invariance’ holds then δ=R∆t. This local volatility yields 
a Brownian–like average (or global) volatility σ2 • ∆t at long times. 
The exponential model prices options correctly without the need 
for fudge-factors like ‚implied volatility‘ that characterize 
financial engineering based on a Gaussian returns model. Fat tails 
in returns are generated by including in (10) a term quadratic in 
(x-δ)/•t, as is shown in fig. 3. So financial data can be reproduced 
falsifiably by a simple stochastic model. 
 
In a stochastic model, dB(t) is a Wiener process, but •D(x,t)dB(t) is 
not a Wiener process if the diffusion coefficient D depends on x 
(noise terms where D depends on t alone, and not on x, are 
equivalent to Wiener processes by a time transformation). This is 
the main point, that the formk of the diffusion coefficient D(x,t), 
that defines the noise term •D(x,t)dB(t) in dynamics, should be 
deduced empirically. The alternative would be to assume a 
dynamical model that tries to impose a preconceived diffusion 
coefficient on the data. Our program is to respect the noise and 
therfore first to discover the form of the empirical distribution. 
Then, we determine the time dependence of the distribution’s 
parameters from the data, and use that information to deduce a 
dynamical model: plugging the empirical distribution into a 
stochastic equation allows one to solve the ‘inverse problem’ to 
find the diffusion coefficient that generates the observed 
distribution (McCauley, 2004). This is analogous to the way that 
Newton deduced the inverse square law of gravity from Kepler’s 
orbits. The method of the economist, in contrast, is typically to 
assume a stochastic model and then try to aextract a best fit of 
parameter values for that model from the data. That is, a 
postulated model is used in an attempt to force fit to the data. 
E.g., the Real Business Cycle (RBC) model assumes a particular 
form for the noise term. In contrast with RBC, we deduce the form 
of the noise term from the data. This is physically significant: the 
noise term reflects what the ‘noise traders’ are doing. The noise 
term that would describe a stochastic model of the GNP would 
reflect the nature of the noise in the economy. 
 
Had we restricted ourselves to the assumptions made in Granger 
(1999) or Granger and Newbold (1974, 1986) or to any method 
recommended in the economics literature, then we could not even 
have come close to the dynamics discovery presented in this 
section. The same can be said about the method proposed by 
Crutchfield (1994), which we discuss in part 9. The dynamics of 
the exponential model described above is completely new: aside 
from the Levy distribution, neither physics, finance, nor 
economics has previously yielded a nonstationarity dynamical 
model of volatility/fat tails without assuming stochastic volatility. 
But the volatility of the data requires that the diffusion coefficient 
depends on both ‘position’ x and time t. Now for another 
important aspect. 
 
There is nonuniqueness in the choice of time dependence of γ, ν 
that can be used to fit finance market data. Given the 
nonuniqueness faced in extracting chaotic dynamics from data, 
this is not a surprise. In applying the new model to option pricing, 
we found (McCauley, 2004) that we have the unwarranted luck 
that the nonuniqueness doesn’t matter on time scales much less 
than a hundred years. Normally, one should not expect such luck. 
 The main aim of economic theory in our era should be to match 
the success of the empirical description of financial markets for at 
least one nonfinancial market. Toward that end, ideas of stability 
and equilibrium in economics should either be verified 
empirically or else completely abandoned as guiding theoretical 
principles. This takes us to the interesting idea of the falsifiability 
of Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand. 
 
 
8. Searching for Adam Smith’s Stabilizing Invisible Hand 
 
Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand is an idea of price changes near a 
stable equilibrium, that supply in a free market should rise to 
meet demand and tend to equilibrate. Stable markets could 
exhibit only small fluctuations about equilibrium, or at least near 
a steady state. Smith‘s idea can be described mathematically as a 
stationary process in stochastic dynamics, one where the Gibbs 
entropy of the market 
 
  
(11) 
becomes asymptotically constant as t increases. Both the average 
return and global/average volatility of a stationary process are 
constants. That is, stable markets are both stationary and 
nonvolatile, but lack of volatility does not imply either 
equilibrium or stability in a model. Neither of these conditions is 
satisfied by financial markets, which instead are both 
  S(t) = − f(x, t ) ln f(x, t)dx 
nonstationary and volatile. Neither the (nonvolatile) Osborne-
Black-Scholes lognormal model nor the (volatile) exponential 
model describes a stationary process. Instead, both of these 
models describe unstable dynamics with ever increasing market 
entropy (McCauley, 2004). Financial markets cannot be 
understood by using equilibrium ideas. 
 
If we could locate equilibrium in a real market then we could 
define ‘value’ meaningfully. ‘Value’ would simply be the 
equilibrium price. The lack of equilibrum in market data means 
that value does not exist as an unambiguous idea, only price 
exists uniquely (to within arbitrage). Therefore, assertions that an 
asset is either undervalued or overvalued are subjective, but 
wishful thinking acted on collectively can lead to big price 
swings, as in the phenomenon of ‘momentum investing’ and the 
stock market bubble of the last decade. This psychological 
condition, the inability to know ‘value’, likely contributes to both 
nonstationarity and fat tails. One can imagine noise traders 
changing their minds frequently, and so trading frequently 
because they’re very uncertain of the ‘value’ of a financial holding 
like a stock or bond. This proposition might be tested via an agent 
based trading model. An interesting exercise would be to 
introduce a trading model where equilibrium ‘exists’ 
mathematically but is in some sense noncomputable (could be 
simply NP-complete, not necessarily Turing (1936) 
noncomputable) and see what would be the effect on the agents’ 
behavior. The liquidity bath term •D(x,t)dB(t) in (7), which is not 
a Wiener process when D(x,t) depends on x (even though dB(t) is 
always Wiener), approximates the effect of these ‘noise traders’. In 
the language of statistical physics, equations (6) and (7) provide 
us with an analog of a mean field approximation to a complex 
system of interacting agents. Real agents have PC’s or Macs, high 
computational capability, but generally can’t do any worthwhile 
calculations when trading because they can’t distinguish 
knowledge from noise, and can only make guesses about future 
prices. I know this from experience. I’m an amateur trader, and so 
is my wife. Trading done by professionals in markets is the closest 
we can come to an analog of performing experiments in physics.  
 
Above, we have assumed that financial markets can be treated 
statistically independently of other markets. This is not strictly 
true but reflects the approximation whereby global finance drives 
other markets. For correlated assets, the Gibbs entropy requires 
the density of returns of those assets, and that density doesn’t 
decouple into statistically independent factors. However, a 
diagonalization of correlation matrix of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model leads to eigenvectors representing sectors (Plerou et al, 
1999), and suggests that we might try to study different sectors 
approximately statistically independently. 
 
Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand is a falsifiable proposition: one need 
only test a set of price or returns data for a given market for 
asymptotic stationarity, or at least for lack of growth and lack of 
volatility (McCauley, 2004). The problem that one faces is that 
typical nonfinancial markets have such sparse data that reliable 
testing is difficult or even impossible (too easy to fit by completely 
wrong models), but that is no ground for teaching the falsified 
and completely unrealistic neo-classical model. Instead, 
empirically based models should be taught. Such models will 
likely be computable, even if the dynamical behavior described 
would be undecideable. Because of nonuniqueness in extracting 
models from data, e.g., I expect that GNP data should be 
relatively easy to fit by using nonstationary, volatile models. To 
date, there is no convincing evidence from empirical data that any 
known market is asymptotically stationary, and market volatility 
is rather common. Instead, the known price and return 
distributions spread without limit as time increases. 
 
Existence proofs of equilibrium in the absence of dynamics are 
common in the study of economic models. I now give an example 
that shows the danger inherent in an existence proof of 
equilibrium in the absence of dynamics that would show how 
such equilibrium could be attained.  
 
Consider Osborne’s model of lognormal market prices (8) where 
d(p,t)=σp2=constant. If we would take r<0, negative expected 
return, then the drift term would provide us with an example of a 
restoring force, an example of the Invisible Hand (McCauley, 
2004). Does the Invisible Hand pull the market toward 
equilibrium? The corresponding Fokker-Planck equation 
describing the price distribution is 
 
 
(12) 
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and, indeed, has a very simple equilibrium solution g(p). 
However, the time dependent solution of (12), the lognormal 
density g(p,t), spreads without limit as t increases and never 
reaches statistical equilibrium. In particular, the second moment 
<p2> increases without limit. The reason that equilibrium is not 
approached is that the spectrum of the Fokker-Planck operator 
defined by (12) is continuous, not discrete. Imposing finite limits 
on p, price controls, would yield a discrete spectrum so that 
statistical equilibrium would then follow asymptotically. 
 
Suppose we would try to approximate the lognormal model (12) 
by making the uncontrolled approximation p2•<p2> in the price 
diffusion coefficient σp2p2. The second moment <p2> is time-
dependent, but if we systematically define a new time variable t‘ 
via integration, then we obtain the equivalent stochastic 
differential equation 
 
(13) 
where, because c is constant and r<0, the uncontrolled 
approximation (13) describes a stationary process, the 
Smoluchowski-Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. In this case, the time-
dependent density g(p,t) approaches an equilibrium Gaussian 
density geq(p) as t goes to infinity, whereas the correct density 
described by (12) is nonstationary. Were financial markets 
described by a stochastic process like (13), then The Invisible 
Hand (negative returns combined with d(p) = constant) would 
always push the market toward statistical equilibrium. The model 
(13) describes real data in physics (where p is the speed of a 
  dp = rpdt' +cdB
colloidal particle in Brownian motion a heat bath), but not at all in 
finance. 
 
Again, the challenge put to economists and econophysicists is to 
find at least one market where there is empirical evidence for the 
stabilizing Invisible Hand. By this, I do not mean assuming a 
stationary process and then force-fitting it to the data, an illegal 
proceedure that is often done in finance. I mean: deduce the form 
of the noise term from the data, and show that the variance does 
not spread as time increases, at the very least. Nonstationary 
methods have been used to analyze economic data, but 
nonstationarity alone is not enough, assuming a time dependent 
local volatility is not enough: fat tails, or ‘volatility’, cannot be 
correctly described by such an assumption. In general, the data 
will imply a diffusion coefficient that depends not merely on time 
but on returns as well (such models have not been studied in 
physics either!). This is the lesson of our finance model described 
above, a lesson that is not reflected by any known data analysis in 
economics to date. 
 
Financial markets, including option pricing, have been accurately 
described by very simple stochastic dynamics, so where‘s the 
complexity? The question of complexity is a question of 
computational limitations or intractability. The highest degree of 
computational complexity is that of a Turing machine (Feynman, 
1996; Velupillai, 2000). 
 
We expect that markets are not merely stochastic but are also in 
some yet to be defined sense complex. Can the empirically 
observed time series of a complex system be used to infer the 
underlying dynamics? I return next to deterministic dynamics, 
leaving it to others to combine the ideas of stochasticity and 
complexity in an empirically useful or at least theoretically 
satisfying way. My excuse is that 
 
“… the human brain is a rather limited intellectual tool, better 
suited to hunting rabbits than doing mathematics, …” 
David Ruelle (2004) 
 
In what follows, I assume that all functions are Turing 
computable and that computable numbers are used as control 
parameters and initial conditions. I want to avoid the trivial 
noncomputability of the measure one set of numbers that can be 
defined to ‚exist‘ in the continuum, but cannot be generated 
algorithmically. 
 
 
9. Complexity in Physics, Biology, and Economics 
 
I consider here only two ideas of maximal computational 
complexity. Other ideas of complexity are the Chomsky hierarchy 
of languages, NP-completeness, and a bewildering zoo of finer 
degrees of computational intractability 
(http://www.complexityzoo.com/). To date, we have no 
physically or biologically motivated definitions of complexity, in 
spite of the fact that cell biology provides us with numerous 
examples of complexity. Our everyday computers are an example 
of complexity and can be described mathematically as Newtonian 
electro-mechanical machines. 
 
First, consider algorithmic complexity. This is the notion that the 
dynamics consists in simply writing down a sequence, starting 
from some initial condition, and that there is no algorithm that 
compresses the rule for generating the sequence. The continued 
fraction expansion of x(x+2)=1 to generate •2-1 is not 
algorithmically complex, e.g. A nontrivial example of algorithmic 
complexity is perhaps given by the rules for generating scalefree 
networks (Barabasi, 2002): starting from an already present node, 
one links to another node where the new node is drawn from a 
certain probability distribution. So far, these ideas have not been 
well enough developed to use them to describe money transfers 
on networks in any empirically correct way. The digit expansions 
of rational numbers are not examples of algorithmically complex 
patterns, because every rational is described by a very short 
algorithm: divide an integer P by another integer Q. 
 
A cautionary note: the shortest algorithm that generates the 
statistics or pattern is not necessarily the one that explains the real 
time evolution of the phenomena. An example is the use of 
selfaffine fractals to generate pictures of mountain landscapes. In 
that case, the simple dynamics used to generate the art (Barnsley, 
1988) gives us no insight into the physics/geology of mountain 
formation. Maybe algorithmic complexity comes closest to 
describing our nonhabitual/nonrecurring decisions in everyday 
life.   
 
This leads us to a second, extremely interesting way to generate 
maximal complexity (Moore, 1990, 1991). Low dimensional 
iterated maps that are equivalent to Turing machines provide 
examples. These dynamical systems have no attractors, no 
symbolic dynamics/no generating partition, and so exhibit no 
scaling laws that would inform us of behavior at smaller length 
scales in terms of observed dynamics at larger length scales. 
Instead, ‚surprises‘, new unforeseen behavior, are possible at all 
length scales. By length scales, I think here of the hierarchy of 
coarsegrainings defined by the generating partition in a chaotic 
system, where one looks in finer and finer detail at the dynamics, 
increasing the precision of the microscope, so to speak. Without 
symbolic dynamics and the corresponding generating partition, it 
is not clear how or even if a Turing-equivalent dynamical system 
could be extracted from time series. The output of Moore’s maps 
must already be included as a subset of binary expansions of 
numbers, so how can we understand and distinguish that class of 
nonperiodic digital patterns, number theoretically? 
 
Mutations of viruses and bacteria to new forms provide an 
example of the surprises characteristic of complexity. In markets, 
the complexity may appear in two ways: first, the expected return 
r can change suddenly due to market psychology, or liquidity can 
dry up in a crash. On a longer time scale, the entire market 
distribution may change its form due to factors/surprises beyond 
our horizon of expectations. In this respect, it would be of interest 
to know if financial returns statistics exhibited fat tails before 
1987.  
 
In everyday life, surprises are regarded as something ‘external’, 
arising from factors not taken into account in our attempt to 
forecast a sequence of events. In Moore’s iterated maps, the 
surprises arise internally from the system’s dynamics. That every 
highly complicated computer program has bugs may be an 
example of the surprises of complexity: you can only discover the 
bugs by running the program. In order to imagine how Moore’s 
surprises could enter into our finance market model, we must 
consider the entire system composed of fluctuating asset price 
(described to zeroth order by (6)) and the liquidity bath, which 
finance theory assumes to remain unchanged. The analogy of the 
liquidity bath with the heat bath for a Brownian particle is 
described in McCauley (2004). In a financial market, the 
appearance of a surprises may cause the liquidity bath to dry up 
suddenly, as in a market crash. In that case, (6) and (7) do not 
apply: a liquidity drought is not a Wiener, exponential, or any 
other continuous time stochastic process, it is more approximately 
the complete absence of the noise traders. In order to try to 
describe surprises mathematically, one could try to model the 
interacting system of agents trying to set prices, avoiding 
assuming the liquidity bath/Brownian motion approximation 
explicitly. But then one likely faces the computational complexity 
of a neural net equivalent to a Turing machine. Siegelman (1995) 
has suggested the equivalence of Moore’s maps with neural nets. 
In any case, we are not used to the idea that surprises are 
generated within the system, especially for low-dimensional 
deterministic dynamics. 
 
Continuing with Moore’s maps, for a deterministic dynamical 
system with universal computational capability a classification 
into topologic universality classes is impossible. Given an 
algorithm for the computation of an initial condition to as many 
digits as computer time allows, nothing can be said in advance 
about the future either statistically or otherwise  because the future is 
computationally undecideable. This maximum degree of 
computational complexity occurs in low dimensional nonintegrable 
conservative Newtonian dynamics. In particular, billiard ball 
dynamics exhibit positive Liapunov exponents and provide us 
with an example of a chaotic system that is mixing (Cvitanovic et 
al’, 2003). But billiard balls can also be used to compute reversibly 
and universally (Fredkin and Toffoli, 1982). Such a method of 
computation would be impractical because the positive Liapunov 
exponents magnify errors in initial conditions of the billiard balls, 
messing up the computation. 
 
Molecular biology is apparently largely about complexity at the 
cellular and molecular (DNA-protein) level. E.g., the thick, 
impressive, and heavy text by Alberts et al (2002) is an 
encyclopedia of cell biology, but displays no equations. Again, 
with no equations as an aid, Weinberg (1999) describes the 5-6 
independent mutations required to produce a metastasizing 
tumor. All these impressive biological phenomena may remind us 
more of the results of a complicated computer program than of a 
dynamical system, and have all been discovered reductively by 
standard isolation of cause and effect in controlled, repeatable 
experiments. We might learn something about complexity 
‚physically‘ were we able to introduce some useful equations into 
Alberts et al. The Nobel Prize winning physicist-turned-
biophysicist Ivar Giæver (1999) has remarked on the difference 
between biology and physics texts: “Either they are right or we 
are right, and if we are right then we should put some equations 
in that text.”  
 
Many economists and econophysicists would like to use 
biological analogies in economics, but the stumbling block is the 
complete absence of a dynamical systems description of biological 
evolution. Instead of simple equations, we have simple objects 
(genes) that behave like symbols in a complicated computer 
program. Complex adaptable mathematical models 
notwithstanding, there exists no mathematical description of 
evolution that is empirically correct at the macroscopic or 
microscopic level. Schrödinger (1944), following the track initiated 
by Mendel2 that eventually led to the identification of the 
molecular structure of DNA and the genetic code, explained quite 
clearly why evolution can only be understood mutation by 
mutation at the molecular  level of genes. Mendelism provides us 
with a falsifiable example of Darwinism, at the cellular level, the 
only precise definition of biological evolution, there being no 
falsifiable model of Darwinism at the macroscopic level. That is, 
we can understand how a cell mutates to a new form, but we do 
not have a picture of how a fish evolves into a bird. That is not to 
                                                
2 It may be of some interest that Mendel was trained in the Galilean method: he studied and 
taught physics in Vienna. He did not get an academic position, and so retrested to Brnn and 
studied peas. 
say that it hasn’t happened, only that we don‘t have a model that 
helps us to imagine the details, which must be grounded in 
complicated cellular interactions that are not yet understood. 
Weinberg (1999) suggests that our lack of understanding of 
cellular networks also limits our understanding of cancer, where 
studying cellular interactions empirically will be required in order 
to understand how certain genes are turned on or off. 
 
The terms ‘emergence’ and ‘self-organization’ are not precisely 
defined, they mean different things to different people. I 
shamelessly confess that I have never understood what people 
have in mind, other than symmetry-breaking and pattern 
formation at a bifurcation in dynamics, when they claim that a 
system ‘self organizes’3. Some researchers who study complex 
models mathematically expect to discover new, ‚emergent‘ 
dynamics for complex systems, but so far no one has produced an 
empirically relevant or even theoretically clear example. See Lee 
(2004) for a readable account of some of the usual ideas of self-
organization and emergence. Crutchfield and Young (1990), 
Crutchfield4 (1994) and others have emphasized the interesting 
idea of nontrivial computational capability appearing/emerging 
in a dynamical system due to bifurcations. This doesn’t present us 
with any new dynamics, it’s simply about computational 
                                                
3 Hermann Haken (1983), at the Landau-Ginzburg level of nonequilibrium statistical physics, 
provided examples of bifurcations to pattern formation via symmetry breaking. All 
subsequent writers have used ‘self-organized’ as if the term would be self-explanatory, even 
when there is no apparent symmetry breaking. Is a deterministic or noisy stable equilibrium 
point or limit cycle (or other invariant set without escape) an example of self-organization? If 
so, then maybe we don’t need the fancy phrase. According to Julian Palmore (1964): if you 
can’t define your terms precisely then you don’t know what you’re talking about. 
 
4
 My essay is completely contrary to the postmodernist philosophical outlook expressed, especially in 
part I, of Crutchfield’s 1994 paper.  
capability appearing within already existing dynamics at a 
bifurcation to chaos or beyond. Crutchfield assumes a generating 
partition and symbolic dynamics, but Moore has shown that we 
have to give up that idea for dynamics with Turing-equivalent 
complexity. Another weakness in Crutchfield is the restriction of 
noise to stationary processes. That won’t work for market data, or 
for realistic market models either. There is, in my opinion, another 
weakness in that program: if we would apply that proposed 
method of discovery to Galilean and Keplerian orbits, then we 
would discover only trivial automata reflecting orbits of period 
zero and one. Newton did considerably better, and we’ve done 
better in finance theory, so there must be more to the story. One 
can argue: the scheme wasn’t invented to discover equations of 
motion, it was invented as an attempt to botanize complexity. In 
that case, can the program be applied to teach us something new 
and unexpected about empirical data? Why doesn’t someone try 
to apply it to market data? Crutchfield’s scheme is in any case far 
more specific than whaat proposed by Mirowski (2002) proposed 
in a similar vein. 
 
Given the prevailing confusion over ‘emergence’, I seize the 
opportunity to offer an observation to try to clarify at least one 
point: whatever length and time scales one studies, one first needs 
to discover approximately invariant objects before one can hope to 
discover any possible new dynamics5. The ‘emergent dynamics’, if 
such dynamics can be discovered, will be the dynamics of those 
objects. Now, what many complexity theorists hope and expect is 
                                                
5
 E.g., a cluster, like suburbanization in a city (Lee, 2004), is not an example of an 
approximately invariant object, because the cluster changes on significantly on the length and 
time scale that we want to study it. 
that new dynamical laws beyond physics will somehow emerge 
statistically-observationally at larger length and time scales, laws 
that cannot be derived systematically from phenomena at smaller 
length scales. A good example is that many Darwinists would like 
to be able to ignore physics and chemistry altogether and try to 
understand biological evolution macroscopically, independently 
of the mass of details of genetics, which have emerged from 
controlled experiments and data analysis.  
 
Continuing with my seized opportunity, consider the case of cell 
biology, where the emergent invariant objects are genes. Genes 
constitute a four-letter alphabet used to make three letter words. 
From the perspective of quantum physics, genes and the genetic 
code are a clear example of emergent phenomena. With the 
genetic code, we arrive at the basis for computational complexity 
in biology. Both DNA and RNA are known to have nontrivial 
computational capability (Adelman, 1994; Bennett, 1982; Lipton, 
1989). One can think of the genes as ‚emergent‘ objects on long, 
helical molecules, DNA and RNA. But just because genes and the 
code of life have emerged on a long one dimensional tape, we do 
not yet know any corresponding new dynamical equations that 
describe genetics, cell biology, or cancer. So far, one can only use 
quantum or classical mechanics, or chemical kinetics, in various 
different approximations to try to calculate some aspects of cell 
biology.  
 
My main conclusion is that ‘emergence‘ does not guarantee the 
appearance of new laws of motion. Apparently, invariant objects can 
emerge without the existence of any simple new dynamics to 
describe those objects. Genes obey simple rules and form four 
letter words but that, taken alone, doesn’t tell us much about the 
consequences of genetics, which reflect the most important 
possible example in nature of computational complexity: the 
evolution from molecules to cells and human life.  
 
At a more fundamental level, genes obey the laws of quantum 
mechanics in a heat bath, with nontrivial intermolecular 
interactions. I emphasize that Schrödinger has already explained 
why we should not expect to discover statistically based laws that 
would evolution at the macroscale. So I am not enthusiastic about 
the expectation that new ‚emergent‘ laws of motion will be 
discovered by playing around with nonempirically inspired 
computer models like ‚complex adaptable systems‘. I think that 
we can only have hope of some success in economics, as in 
chemistry, cell biology and finance, by following the traditional 
Galilean path and sticking close to the data. E.g., we can thank 
inventive reductionist methods for the known ways of controlling 
or retarding cancer, once it develops. At the same time, it would 
certainly be interesting to have a falsifiable complex adaptable 
model, if that is possible.  
 
Thinking of examples of emergence in physics, the Newtonian 
level, mass and charge are invariant. The same objects are 
invariant in quantum theory, which obeys exactly the same local 
space-time invariance principles as does the Newtonian 
mechanics, and gives rise to the same global conservation laws6. 
                                                
6
 Integrable systems, like the hydrogen atom, whether classical or quantum can be solved by 
direct use of the conservation laws (this is the method of every text). In a nonintegrable 
system like the helium atom, a three body problem (and chaotic), that is impossible. 
We do not yet understand how Newtonian mechanics ‚emerges‘ 
from quantum mechanics in a self-consistent mathematical way. 
Similarly, we do not understand why genes should behave like 
elements of a classical computer, while the DNA molecule 
requires quantum mechanics for its formation and description. 
The famous quantum measurement problem is unsolved, so we 
do not understand mathematically within quantum theory how 
quantum phase coherence is destroyed. Quantum phase coherence 
must be destroyed in order that a Newtonian description, or 
classical statistical mechanics, becomes valid as a mathematical 
limit as Planck’s constant vanishes. One can make arguments 
about the destruction of phase coherence via external noise in the 
heat bath defined by the environment, but this path only begs the 
question. However, this incompleteness in understanding does 
not reduce our confidence in either classical or quantum 
mechanics, because all known observations of the motions of 
masses and charges are described correctly to within reasonable 
or high decimal precision at the length scales where each theory 
applies. One point of mesoscopic physics is to study the no man’s 
land between the quantum and classical limits. 
 
 
I end this essay by suggesting a simpleminded biological analogy. 
The creation of new markets depends on new inventions and their 
exploitation for profit. Mathematical invention has been described 
psychologically by Hadamard (1945). Conventional ideas of 
psychology completely fail to describe the solitary mental act of 
invention, whether in mathematical discovery, or as in the 
                                                                                                                                       
 
invention of the gasoline engine or the digital computer. Every 
breakthrough that leads to a new invention is a ‚surprise‘, 
something emerging from within the system (the system includes 
human brains and human actions) that was not foreseen. A 
completely new product is based on an invention. The creation of 
a successful new market, based on a new product, is partly 
analogous to an epidemic: the disease spreads seemingly 
uncontrollably at first, and then eventually meets limited or 
negative growth. The simplest mathematical model of creation 
that I can think of would be described by the growth of a ‚tree‘, 
where new branches (inventions or breakthroughs) appear 
suddenly without warning. This is not like a search tree in a 
known computer program.  Growth of any kind is a form of 
instability, and mathematical trees reflecting instability do appear 
in nature, in the turbulent eddy cascade e.g., but in that case the 
element of ‚surprise‘ is missing.  
 
Summarizing, I've discussed the Galilean method in physics and 
finance and have suggested that it be applied in economics. 
Computability of a model is certainly necessary, but empirically 
motivated models are necessary beforehand if mathematics is to 
be made effective in general economics, as it has become in the 
specific area of finance. Empirically based models will likely be 
computable in the Turing sense. Market time series and 
histograms are, of course, of limited value in predicting the 
future: they reflect in coarse fashion how we've been behaving 
economically. The future in socio-economic phenomena is to some 
unknown degree undecidable and can't be known in advance, 
even statistically. Using market statistics as a basis for prediction 
assumes that tomorrow will be statistically like yesterday. If 
we’ve modeled carefully, as in finance, then this assumption may 
not get us into hot water so long as there are no surprises. 
Insurance companies make money by assuming that the future 
will be like the past statistically, and lose money when it isn’t. 
 
Of course, one can also make nonempirically based mathematical 
or even nonmathematical models, and assert that if we assume 
this and that, then we expect that such and such will happen. That 
sort of modeling activity is not necessarily completely vacuous, 
because new socio-economic expectations can be made into reality 
by acting strongly enough on wishes or expectations: a model can 
be enforced or legislated, e.g. Both communism (implemented via 
bloody dictatorships) and globalization via deregulation and 
privatization (implemented via legislation, big financial transfers, 
and supragovernmental7 edict) provide examples. In any case, 
models based on real market statistics are useful for confronting 
the pie in the sky claims of ideologues and other true believers 
with the coarse face of reality. Instability and surprises are good 
examples of market reality in our era. 
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 Examples of powerful supragovernmental organizations are the IMF, the world Bank,the World trade 
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